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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, mass media, with its unstoppable and astonishing
development, has reached a level of importance in our lives that was
unimaginable few years ago. This new situation is inherent in modem
societies. Without it, our lifestyle would be different; maybe better,
maybe worse, but certainly different from the way we know it today.
Digital newspapers, virtual reality experiences, digital signatures, and
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many other expressions of technology are all signs of the times, which
show us the undeniable reality of the digital society. We, as witnesses to
these deep, substantial transformations, must be prepared not only to enjoy
the comfort and the other positive spin-offs of these developments, but also
to solve the intricate ethical conflicts and legal questions that, undoubtedly,
will arise.
We do not want to, nor can we deny the important role the media
as well as freedom of speech and of the press play in a democratic society.
First, from a political and institutional point of view, the media acts as a
monitor of the governmental organs, legitimizing their actions; Second,
from a social and scientific point of view, it allows huge masses the access
to news and information, turning knowledge into humanity's heritage,
hence permitting sensational scientific and cultural developments.'
However, in spite of the aforementioned advantages, we can not
lose sight of the negative consequences often arising from the press'
activities. These consequences must be both prevented and repaired by the
law.
A depersonalization of information is occurring on all levels.2
Facts and mere speculations frequently go to press without due
corroboration. Bearing in mind that the value of this information is usually
directly proportional to the immediateness of its broadcasting, we can
understand the raw, ferocious battle currently fought by big media
entrepreneurs. A large percentage of newspapers and telivision stations
would rather publish news of dubious veracity than come in second place
after taking time to check the validity of the information.
Moreover, the universality of the information, together with its
public nature, renders the individual powerless and insignificant in
comparison to the huge power structure of the media. As a consequence of
the enormous influence the press has over people, not only are damages
monumental, but also the effects are often irreparable. For instance, it is
difficult to convince people that what appears in their news is wrong.
Besides, editors seldom acknowledge the falseness of their assertions, and
when they do (usually forced by judicial decisions), they do not place
nearly as much emphasis as was placed on the original information.
1. Umberto Eco believes that television is a cultural tool for underdeveloped countries,
showing them what is happening around the world, quoted by, CARLOS FAYT, LA
OMNIPOTENCIA DE LA PRENSA SU JUICIO DE REALIDAD EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA Y
NORTEAMERICANA. (Editorial La Ley 1994).
2. RAMON PIZARRO, RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DE LOS MEDIOS MASIVOS DE
COMUNICACION, HAMMURABI 253 (1991).
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It is indispensable, in order to avoid obstructing a person's full
development, to acknowledge the right to information as a fundamental
right. It is impossible to create a civil conscience according to ethical
rules, or for men to fully develop their intellectual capabilities if the right
to be freely informed is not guaranteed. Therefore, it is necessary to give
constitutional status to the right to information.
Nowadays, the right to choose and judge what one is going
to read, watch, or listen to has become the most important
freedom ... a right which imposes on the government the
duty of satisfying that same right . . . the passive right to
be informed . . . that contains in itself the question of
whether or not man will be able to have a thought of his
3
own ....
This does not imply unrestricted, irresponsible, or unlimited exercise of
this right, but quite the contrary. We believe that besides the economic
and moral injury that can be produced by the media's activities, legislation
must prevent other kinds of injuries that are encroaching on us everyday,
such as the injury caused to children by certain information.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER AND COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION
In Spain, freedom of speech and the right to information are
expressly acknowledged in the 1978 constitution, article 20, which forbids
any kind of previous censorship. It also establishes limits to these rights:
freedom of speech and of the press must be exercised respecting every
other right contained in that constitution, especially the right to honor,
intimacy, self-image, and youth and childhood's protection.
In Germany, similar norms are found (German constitution's
article 5 is the source of the Spanish article 20). For many years, it was
thought that whenever a conflict between honor and freedom of speech
arose, it should be resolved in favor of the former. However, since the
leading case of LUTH,4 it is necessary to consider the conflict distinctly in
each and every concrete case. In 1961, the constitutional court decided
that "the reporter must fulfill the duty of veracity . . . but it is enough to
have carried out what is reasonably necessary to verify the information's
truthfulness . . . " to be exempted from liability.
3. FAYT, supra note 1 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
4. Diego Rosario, El honor y la libertad de expresion (lecture given at Salamanca
University, Spain, Jan. 1996.)
5. FAYT, supra note 1 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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Today, prevalent in European Union law, is the idea that freedom
of speech is superior to honor, etc., whenever it contributes to forming
public opinion.6 Mufioz Machado states that "freedom of speech has
virtually no limit ... .
In the United States, freedom of the press is guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the Constitution (1791) "Congress shall make no law . ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... "8 In addition,
judicial thought is dominated by an interpretation that, undoubtedly, places
the media in a privileged situation. Since the landmark case of New York
Times vs. Sullivan," the Supreme Court of the United States has been
applying the actual malice doctrine, which relies on the principle that the
injured party has to prove that the information was given either "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."'°
The Argentinean constitution guarantees freedom of the press in
article number 14 "[e]very inhabitant of the nation has the following
rights, according to the laws that regulate their exercise . . . to publish his
ideas in the press without previous censorship"" and "Federal congress
shall make no laws abridging freedom of the press nor establishing federal
jurisdiction on such matters .... The Agreement of San Jos6, and the
International Treaty of Civil and Political Rights article 19 also provide
protection in such matters.
As far as the passive subject role is concerned, the Argentinean
Constitution makes no mention of it, but newly-incorporated treaties (such
as the Agreement of San Jos6, Costa Rica, now holding constitutional
status) certainly do, clearly stating that every person has the right to
receive, without previous censorship, information and ideas of any kind
and through different channels.
However, the Argentinean Supreme Court has said that "Freedom
of the press has a meaning greater than the mere exclusion of censorship
6. According to the European Union Treaty, 17th Declaration, the commission was to
present a report by 1993 regarding possible measures to improve the public's access to
information possessed by governmental institutions, SECRETARIA DE ESTADO PARA LAS
COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS 319 (1992).
7. Rosario, supra note 4 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Id. at 254.
11. ARG. CONST. art. 14 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
12. ARG. CONST. art. 32 (editorial note: translated from Spanish). This article's direct
source is the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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and, therefore, constitutional protection must impose a careful handling of
rules and relevant circumstances in order to avoid obstructing the free
press and its essential functions .... " 3
But notwithstanding all these protective measures, "unfortunately
state legislatures pass unconstitutional laws all the time . . '
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN RIGHTS
As was previously noted, many modem constitutions grant special
protection to freedom of speech, as they do with other rights. This is seen
especially in constitutions of western countries, which follow the liberal
tradition of John Locke's natural rights. However, they infrequently
establish a hierarchy among the rights or give any kind of priority list with
which to solve problems involving more than one constitutional right.
Argentina's Supreme Court has tried to clarify this issue by stating
that constitutional laws and the rights emerging from them differ from one
another hierarchically. If we follow this line of thought, we can conclude
that there is an axiological question; therefore, in each concrete case an
appraisal of the rights must be carried out, resolving the conflict in favor
of that right ranked higher in the hierarchy.
Bidart Campos understands that rules declaring rights have all, for
they are part of the same constitution, the same position and hierarchy.
But, the rights themselves, may have a different hierarchy.
IV. CIVIL LAW AND ITS NEW ATTITUDE IN CONFRONTING THE PROBLEM
The new concept of civil law and consequently, the new attitude it
takes when dealing with damage suits, can not be isolated from the
aforementioned conflict of interests that is seen with increasing frequency
everyday. The law must not limit itself to prevention and indemnity.
Occasionally, it must assume a punitive function. It has been argued
whether this punitive side of civil law is constitutional. We believe it is, as
13. See generally opinion of the Supreme Court of Argentina interpreting the freedom of
the press provisions of articles 14, and 32 of the Argentinean Constitution. ARG. CONST. arts.
14, 32 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
14. Joshua Quitmer, The Supreme Court, TIME MAGAZINE, March 31, 1997, at 4. The
article refers to the controversial Communications Decency Act, which restricted freedom of
speech in cyberspace. The Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional on June 26, 1997. See
Fred Cate, A Law Antecedent And Paramount, (last visited 3/29/98)
<http://www.law.indiana.edu/FCLJ/v47/N02/Cate.HTML> as available on the Internet, for
examples of unconstitutional laws (concerning the First Amendment).
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long as it is not arbitrary. And, in our opinion, helps to fulfill the
preventive function, as will be noted in the conclusion.
V. SoME TOPICS CONCERNING CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASS
MEDIA
A. The Leading Case "Ponzetti de Balbin '5
This case is a landmark in the evolutionary process of civil
responsibility in Argentina. The facts will be described briefly, as well as
the Court decision's most noteworthy points.
In September 1981, a popular magazine (similar to People, as far
as style and theme Are concerned) took, without permission, a picture of a
well know Argentine politician, Mr. Balbin, who was struggling for his
life in a hospital intensive care unit. A few hours later, the respected man
passed away and, almost immediately, the picture made it on the cover of
the magazine's next issue. The widow, Mrs. Ponzetti de Balbin, and her
son sued the magazine for moral damages stating that their right to
intimacy had been invaded.
Both the first and second verdicts condemning the publishers were
appealed. The case finally went all the way to the Supreme Court, which
upheld the previous decisions.
Justices Belluscio and Caballero said:
[Flamous people, public men have, as any other inhabitant,
constitutional shelter for their private life ... the public's
interest in Mr. Balbin's health did not require or justify an
intrusion into his most sacred sphere of privacy, as had
occurred with the publishing of this picture. The picture's
ignoble brutality conspires against responsibility,
correctness, decency, and other estimable possibilities of
the information labor. The freedom the defendant has taken
to publish the picture, far exceeds the freedom protected
by the constitution.'6
15. Indalia c/Editorial Atalntida S.A. s/dafios y perjuicios, at 306 (1839); FAYT, supra




B. Extracontractual (non contractual) Responsibility17
Different positions in South America:
1. Subjective imputability:"8 this position is based on the premise
that responsibility is only precedent when the defendant acted with
negligence 'or malice. It excludes objective imputability, 9 arguing that
Article 1113 is only applicable to cases in which objects have played an
important role.
The legal scholars and the courts supporting this position
distinguish between false information (a deliberate, -conscious act intended
to hurt, to cause damage, or dolus) and erroneous information
(unconscious act, not intended to hurt or damage; the journalist acts de
bonafide). In the first case, the media is fully responsible both civilly and
criminally. In the second, there would be no liability where the mistake
was excusable.
This position seems very restrictive, especially when the
newspapers and the journalist are not liable for false news, when the
importance of the source exonerates them from checking the information's
veracity or, when they reproduce the information exactly as it was given
for broadcasting by public authority.
Nevertheless, Argentina's Supreme Court has established that
simple negligence is enough to hold the media responsible, except when the
information concerns public affairs or interest. In this case, the doctrine of
actual malice is applicable.
The Supreme Court of the United States makes a distinction
depending on the injured party:
If it is a regular citizen (John Doe), simple negligence is enough,
but if the subject is a public official, then actual malice is necessary to
convict the media.'
17. This expression is used to convey the idea of civil responsibility linked to torts.
18. Subjective imputability means that the law makes a person responsible in the particular
case, with special consideration given to the subject's actions. The distinction between
negligence and malice is fundamental.
19. Objective imputability means that the law does not take into account the subject's
action when it determines responsibility. It is completely irrelevant whether the person acted with
negligence or malice. The responsibility rests on a different idea, such as created risk or the
legal duty of care. For instance, in a tort case involving a car accident where a pedestrian has
been run over by a car, the law makes the driver responsible regardless of whether he has acted
with negligence or not. Instead, the responsibility is based on the driver's legal duty of care
(alterum non laedere).
20. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) for the distinction between the regular
citizen and public figures.
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2. Abuse of rights: Admits the subjective base of the
responsibility, but emphasizes the fact that any abuse in the exercise of
freedom of the press (exceeding the goals the law had in mind when it
declared it) generates responsibility.
3. Another theory: Kemelmajer de Carlucci and Parellada
believe that responsibility of the media is objective, based on the legal duty
of care or in the risk created by its employees' activities, while the
journalists have a subjective-based responsibility. The latter is
indispensable in order to hold the media responsible.
C. Minority Protection
The media's incessant hold over our private lives, taking up leisure
time or spare time traditionally occupied by other activities, surrounds us
with a rough sea of information, which many times we (the receptors) do
not process or discern correctly. This constitutes an especially
troublesome problem for children in their formative years. In turn, this
influence commits us to a challenge we cannot neglect: to find the best way
to harmonize the free exercise of the right to information and children's
right to protection.
Should we allow children, who lack the ability to choose and judge
the information they receive, to be exposed to harmful, and sometimes
obscene manifestation that hinder their natural development and may affect
their mental health forever?
We do not believe so. The consequences are, unfortunately,
disastrous. For instance, in Germany most of the TV watching population
finds it difficult to distinguish between junk news and important news.
About fifty percent of children between the age of six and twelve believe
that murder is man's natural way of dying. That grotesque example
clearly illustrates television's reality-distorting influence on children.2'
Before continuing further into this matter, it is of particular
importance to determine the active legitimization, or in other words, to
clearly establish whether or not someone can be a plaintiff in cases
regarding child protection, and whether or not someone can sue the media
on behalf of the child.
Basically there are, three possible scenarios:
1. Only those who have suffered moral damage (either directly or
indirectly); example of the latter: the father suing on behalf of his child is
legitimized by law to sue. This theory avoids some of the problems found
in the second option (see below), but is unacceptably restrictive. It
21. See FAYT, supra note 1.
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significantly limits the possibility of effective exercise of the right for the
benefit of children as a whole, There is no actual prevention, but, instead,
a mere indemnity of the damage. It does not provide social protection.
2. Any person may sue in defense of general interest:
This scenario offers a chance at both prevention and indemnity. It
obviously energizes the process of social protection, since surely at least
one of the millions of adults will be watching out for the children's well-
being. However, its strength is its weakness; its virtues are precisely its
flaws.
How can it be so? Let us see. Up to what point can a subject (an
individual, the church, moral, religious or any other sort of association)
whose moral premises may not (in fact many times do not) coincide with
those of the population, use this plaintiff power to restrict.
Implementing such open criteria for legitimization may generate a
pathological situation in which an individual or, even worse (because of the
bureaucracy and the conflict of interest in all entities of corporate
character) an institution imposes censorship in defense of supreme general
interests or people's healthy morals, etc.
3. Restrictive legitimization with presumed damages:
Our preferred scenario would combine elements from these two
options limited legitimization (only those who have suffered injury may
sue), but establish a presumption of damages that should be overcome by
the media in order to be free from liability.
The legal process should not necessarily end up in a monetary
indemnity, but instead, whenever possible it should 'order preventive
measures (such as changing times of broadcast, etc.). In cases where such
measures are not possible, we propose a monetary indemnity (similar to a
fine) which would be given to charity.'
Even though this problem is solved mainly by writ of mandamus,
it fails in the preventive aspect because it does not generate liability, hence
the media has no reason to avoid future broadcasting.
D. The Controversy on the Extension of Redresses
Over the years, there has been an exhausting discussion on whether
judges should grant complete indemnities, fully comprehensive of the
injury done or, instead, give limited, more company-friendly redresses.
22. In Oregon, 60% of the amount of punitive damages must be paid to the state, up to
20% may be paid to the plaintiff's lawyers and the plaintiff himself cannot receive any portion of
it if he is found partially responsible, OREGON REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1993), Gladys Alvarez et
al., Limitacion de la responsabilidad por dahios. Un enfoque socio-economico, LA LEY, May 6,
1997.
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This question involves on one side the victim's right to receive exactly
what has been taken from him/her, and, on the other side, the need for a
standard and economically efficient system based on fixed valuations of
damages. 23. So we wonder, is there a valid limit on indemnities? If so,
what is that limit? What kind of criteria should we apply in our search for
justice?
Granted, the victim is not entitled to a larger amount of money
than the quantity determined by the extension of the injury suffered
(otherwise, there would be an illicit enrichment). However, that is not the
only factor to be taken into account. First of all, every time a judge grants
an insufficient redress (covering the injury only partially, leaving the
remainder unrepaired), the victim's rights are violated. Modem civil law
imposes on the person responsible the duty of reestablishing the situation
of the victim (prior to the harmful action.) The sentence must be a return
to balance, neutralizing the unfairly suffered damage.' Second, we must
not forget that civil law has a preventive function, and that the whole
society is affected whenever this function is not fulfilled.
In comparative legislation, there are two opposing solutions to this
problem:
1. Systems based on limited responsibility (liability)
Such solutions tend to standardize damages, according to various
rules, in an attempt to avoid unfair indemnities.
After analyzing these limited liability systems, we quickly realize
that they fail to 'serve their purpose. They are, in fact, arbitrary because
they do not consider which factors have led to the injury in each specific
case. Therefore, the victim may be injured not only once, but twice
through unfair indemnity. The victim is the big loser of the process that
supposedly was meant to help him/her. Of course the system does have
some positive aspects. First, It allows insurance companies to make exact
economic calculations based on probabilities and, in doing so, the limited
responsibility system guarantees that the victim receives, at least, a portion
of what is owed to him/her.' Second, it makes insurance policies cheaper,
reducing costs for companies and lowering prices to the public.
23. From the economic point of view.
24. It is completely irrelevant whether the damage has been unfairly caused or not.
Whenever two people take part in a harmful action, one innocently causing it, the other
innocently suffering it, we have two innocent people. It doesn't seem fair to make the one who
unfairly suffered bear the damage (although the other person did not cause it unfairly).
25. Important authors have taken this position. For instance, Emilia Lioveras del 5to.
Congreso Internacional de Dafios, Universidad de Buenos Aires, (Apr. 25, 1997).
996 [Vol. 4:987
1998]
Nevertheless, we agree with Mosset Iturraspe that a system that
establishes limited redresses, with a maximum amount to be given for each
type of injury (regardless of its real entity) is odious, capricious and it
breaks the general principles of law. Moreover, these systems take a
materialistic approach to the problem, which dehumanizes such an
important issue.
Pre-established maximum amounts (of money) seem to be
unfair to the victim. They discourage preventive action
(which is undeniably unfair to society); and, very likely,
litigation levels will increase due to these limits (either
their constitutionality will be attacked, or it will be tried
under malicious or negligent conduct in order to avoid the
limits).26
Such systems have been adopted in many legal systems around the
world.?7 In Spain a law enacted on November 8, 1995 establishes that the
total amount to be granted in moral damage cases is the same for every
victim.
2. Systems based on integral responsibility
In these kinds of systems, the focus is moved from the cause of the
injury to the injury itself and the person who suffers it. The main idea is
that every injury that has been unfairly suffered must be fully repaired,
regardless of whether it has been unfairly caused or not.?
The Constitution of Arizona, article 18, adopts this system: "The
right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated,
and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."29
Some precedents of the International Court of Justice have imposed
punitive damages, for instance: Janes (1926), 4 RIAA, 81; Putnam
(1927), 4 RIAA, 151; Kennedy (1927), 4 RIAA, 194. These sentences
seem to have been inspired by the same reasons found in other systems.
This solution seems to be more benevolent to the victim, providing
relief for the injury, which is partially denied by limited liability systems.
26. Malice or negligence avoids the limitation, giving place to integral indemnities. See
generally FAYT, supra note 1.
27. For instance: S.C. CODE ANN § 15.78.120 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §
4.56.250 (Supp 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.21.102.5 (1987); and N.H. REV. REV. STAT.
ANN § 508: 4-d (Supp. 1987).
28. See Gertz, supra note 20.
29. ARIZ. CONST. art. 18.
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We will not go deeper into these systems but it is this type of system we
endorse.
3. Punitive damages
Before entering the final part of this article, let's make a brief
review of the functions the redress must fulfill in today's civil law. First,
It must repair the injury completely: Second, It must prevent harmful
actions from happening again. Third, it must carry out a punitive function,
which is closely related to the preventive function.
Our concerns are centered around this last function. In those cases
where the injury has been caused maliciously, the amount of indemnity
should be increased, regardless of any consideration as to the extent of the
injury.30 We will explain this idea in the conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having previously explained how important the preventive function
of law is in this matter, we dare to venture into a field that, for us, is
particularly dark. Knowing that there is not a definite or perfect solution,
our intent is to find a fair solution and new alternatives because "the big
challenge of our time lies . . .not in determining which or how many
rights there are ... but in reaching suitable ways to guarantee them .
(citation omitted)
In many cases, the pecuniary compensation set by courts does not
adequately fulfill the laws preventive goal. This can clearly be seen
through an example: a newspaper is faced with the option of publishing
information known to be false, (or harmful to someone's honor), making
large amounts of money (which usually greatly exceed the total amount
granted by judges for damages) and paying the indemnity, or not
publishing, which releases it from paying any compensation but also
deprives it of immense earnings. In most cases the media will choose the
second alternative. In the example, the conviction does not give the
newspaper a reason to prevent it from repeating the same action in the
future. The sentence does not provide what the old Italian master,
Romagnosi, called 150 years ago, the controspinta.31
It would also be appropriate that in those cases where the injury
(which may or may not be illegal) occurred with evident eagerness for
30. Since it implies a punishment similar to criminal law's penalties, all guarantees
acknowledged in criminal trials (non bis in idern, in dubio pro reo, etc.) must be assured.
31. The spinta criminosa is the driving force of crime. The controspinta is the reason that
the punishment gives to the criminal to avoid a relapse. SEBASTIAN SOLER, DERECHO PENAL
ARGENTINO II 381 (Tipografica Editora Argentina, Ba As., 1953).
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economic gain and there is no criminal responsibility, to provide the
controspinta, the judge should establish a plus over the damage's
indemnity. He should take into account the probable profit the media may
obtain. By doing so, the sentence not only gives the media a very good
reason to avoid relapsing, but it becomes a warning for other members of
the media as well.
The goal of this proposal is to prevent a person's most intimate
rights from becoming profitable instruments of the powerful machinery
represented by modern mass media, as well as to instill a necessary
minimum standard of ethics in journalism, because, as Walter Williams
said "Nobody can write as a journalist what a gentleman cannot say. " 32
That, and nothing more, is our goal.
32. PIZARRO, supra note 2. (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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